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Abstract 
 
We use detailed ethnographic evidence to design and interpret a broad representative survey of 
800 households in Delhi’s slums, examining the processes by which residents gain access to 
formal government and develop their own, informal, modes of leadership. While ethnically 
homogeneous slums transplant rural institutions to the city, newer and ethnically diverse slums 
depend on informal leaders who gain their authority through political connections, education and 
network entrepreneurship. Education and political affiliation are more important than seniority in 
determining a leader’s influence. Informal leaders are accessible to all slum dwellers, but formal 
government figures are most accessed by the wealthy and the well-connected.  
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I. Introduction 
 
For the first time ever, the majority of the world’s population lives in cities (World Bank 1999, 
Wratten 1995). Migrants to the burgeoning slums of the developing world face the difficult 
challenge of securing access to vital services and protecting their lives and livelihoods. Even 
while the scale, heterogeneity and relative anonymity of cities may limit the effectiveness of 
traditional institutions, the urban environment facilitates the development of new strategies for 
the poor to survive and advance. 
Unlike rural areas, cities concentrate the avatars of political power—the offices, 
headquarters and assemblies—in close proximity to their constituents (Jha 1999). As a result, 
urban social networks may encompass not just local elites, as in rural settings (see e.g. Platteau 
1995), but regional and national decision-makers as well. These additional opportunities for 
interaction between urban residents and policymakers underpin the familiar critique that an 
‘urban bias’ exists in development policy. Though such a bias may exist, it is important to 
identify which urban residents are being over-represented in political discourse. If it is in fact the 
poorest migrants that gain from improved access to decision-makers and services by moving to 
the city, then urbanization, rather than being a strain on resources that is to be discouraged, may 
in fact provide a means to better governance and poverty alleviation. Unfortunately, due to an 
arguably strong ‘rural bias’ in development data and inquiry, little quantitative evidence is 
available either on the strategies of network formation or on the actual political networks of the 
urban poor.  
In this study, we use both qualitative and quantitative evidence to uncover the strategies 
developed by the poor of Delhi to access government and services. A central focus of the study is 
not only to identify the determinants of access to governance networks by slum dwellers, but also 
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to trace the role of informal slum leaders (pradhans) as intermediaries between the formal 
government and the urban poor. The qualitative evidence draws on interviews and observations 
carried out in four different slums on intra-community dispute resolution, risk management 
procedures, and the processes by which leaders gain legitimacy and exert authority. We find that 
length of tenure, political status, environmental hazards, and migrants’ distance from their home 
districts all loom large as the drivers of the problems that communities and their leaders invoke. 
Links to political parties, a proven track record, and claims to a democratic mandate are the 
primary sources of legitimacy, even when leaders have acquired power through traditional 
means. 
Our broader quantitative survey, informed by themes that emerged from the qualitative 
research, was administered to a representative sample of households and community leaders 
from 30 randomly-selected recognized slums. It reveals that slum leaders play a central role as 
intermediaries with the formal authorities. Pradhans are more likely to speak on the slums’ 
behalf in the newest slums, while facilitating direct access to politicians among residents of 
ethnic enclaves. Education and political affiliation are more important than seniority in 
determining the pradhan’s influence, which is strongest in the newest slums and in ethnic 
enclaves. In contrast, direct access to formal government is the preserve of the wealthy and well-
connected. 
 Section II discusses the scholarly and social context of the study and the methodology. 
Section III presents qualitative evidence on the governance mechanisms at work within four 
different slums, while Section IV presents the quantitative analysis of these issues. Section V 
concludes. 
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II. Methodology 
 
The quantitative analysis of survey data has the advantage of making generalizable statements 
about large populations, but it is disadvantaged by an unwieldy apparatus that tends to limit what 
it reveals to hypotheses that circulate within academic or policy circles.  Survey modules are 
often borrowed wholesale from previous questionnaires originally designed to address a different 
set of issues, then propagated over the Internet. These are of limited use for studying 
understudied populations, such as slum dwellers, or novel topics, such as slum leadership. Many 
econometricians also tend to analyze data collected by others from unfamiliar settings. Informed 
by potentially dated secondary literatures, these run the risk of overlooking the current reality of 
the subjects under study. Innovations in the literature thus can be more the result of a speculative 
moment in an air-conditioned office rather than the active exploration and dismissal of 
alternative hypotheses in the field. 
By administering specialized surveys, economists have attempted to overcome such 
shortcomings. This epistemological tradition dates at least as far back as Epstein (1962), 
followed by Bardhan and Rudra (1978), Bliss and Stern (1982) and many others. Our paper goes 
a step further by employing the “participatory econometrics” approach (Rao 1997, Rao 2002), 
integrating participatory appraisals, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and participant 
observation with quantitative data from representative surveys. The survey instruments emerge 
from the qualitative investigation, drawing on insights from the field to define topics of interest 
and identify appropriate methods of measurement.  
Participatory econometrics uses qualitative insights to generate hypotheses whose 
generalizability can be tested through a broader analysis of quantitative data. Qualitative insights 
allow for a greater emphasis on the study of process and contextual issues that complement the 
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advantages of quantitative methods in measuring outcomes. The method differs from other 
mixed approaches by giving an econometric analysis a central role in the exercise and viewing 
respondents as contributors to the analytical work. Researchers from both qualitative and 
quantitative traditions are involved in every step of the process, from mixed method data 
collection to mixed method analysis. Thus, participatory econometrics seeks to integrate 
econometric and qualitative techniques with the spirit of participatory development (Chambers 
1997). 
The qualitative work gathered for this study focused on four slums. They were selected 
along two dimensions: the proximity of the residents’ states of origin, and the age of the 
settlements. Thus, most of the residents of two slums haled from the nearby states of Uttar 
Pradesh and Rajasthan, while those of the other two came from distant West Bengal and Tamil 
Nadu. Furthermore, two newly-settled slum sites were chosen to provide contrast with two long-
established settlements. Over the course of three weeks, eleven specialists from both economics 
and sociology conducted approximately one hundred field discussions, consisting of 
neighborhood focus groups and interviews of slum dwellers, community leaders and government 
officials.  
At the end of the three-week research period, a review workshop with the entire team was 
organized in which a questionnaire was systematically constructed on the basis of the qualitative 
findings. Though the questionnaire covered a wide variety of issues ranging from basic 
household information and social networks to marriage practices, the questions were tailored to 
address specific questions that arose during the course of the qualitative fieldwork. At the end of 
the questionnaire workshop, the same team went back to conduct three more weeks of interviews 
in the four slums, during which period the survey instrument was also pre-tested and modified. 
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In the seventh week, the final survey was administered to a clustered random sample of 
802 households drawn from 30 slums in Delhii. The four selected for ethnographic study were 
augmented with 26 slums selected at random from the Delhi government’s newest city-wide 
slum register.ii The qualitative data weres transcribed and entered into a QSR-Nudist database, 
and the quantitative data were entered into a computerized database. In this way, lessons from 
and constant dialogue with the qualitative findings enabled broader and more representative 
claims to be made on the basis of the quantitative data.  
 
Literature and Context 
 
The scholarly literature on slums and their leadership structures has several characteristics that 
render it problematic for policy purposes. The first is that, by virtue of contributions from 
extraordinarily rich ethnographic accounts, we know more about specific aspects of life in 
specific slums than the general dynamics of the internal and external governance processes that 
underpin their creation and maintenance. From the United States (Waldinger 1996, Venkatesh 
2000) to Mexico (Lomnitz 1977, Selby, Murphy and Lorenzen 1990, Chant 1991) to Guatemala 
(Roberts 1995) to Brazil (Pearlman 1976, Scheper-Hughes 1992) to Indonesia (Jellenik 1991) to 
India (Roy 2002) to Egypt (Singerman 1996)iii, the most prominent and highest quality research 
on urban poverty has been largely ethnographic. 
Part of the reason for the quantitative shortfall is that collecting data on slum dwellers is a 
difficult exercise: residents move frequently and often include illegal immigrants who endeavor 
to live and work in the shadow of the law. Aggregate demographic trends, urbanization rates, and 
migration patterns are relatively well known (e.g., Misra and Misra 1998, National Research 
Council 2003), but detailed household level data on survival and mobility strategies in poor 
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urban communities remain limited. Indeed, much of what the development community ‘knows’ 
about the coping strategies of the poor (e.g., Besley 1995) comes from large household surveys 
carried out on rural populations.iv 
Cities tend to be more complex than rural settings. Slum dwellers have access to a much 
broader range of potential contacts, transcending caste and identity and encompassing both 
traditional leaders and tiers of formal government. These contacts may provide alternative 
channels, with informal provision of services substituting for or complementing formal 
government, or they may interact in more intricate ways, with informal leaders facilitating access 
to formal leadership. Policy based upon studies of the poor in rural settings neglect the 
differences in organization and enforcement among urban communities and the range of extra-
community networks that the urban context affords the poor. Without considering the urban 
context, such studies will be incomplete and misleading.  
It is into the space created by these three characteristics that the current study steps. We 
seek to further understand how collective action problems are addressed within the slums, and 
the strategies that slum dwellers call upon to tap the resources of the state and markets within 
India’s capital. Delhi is hardly ‘representative’ of cities in the developing world or even in India. 
Yet as a focus of multiple tiers of government and the opportunities that these present for the 
poor, Delhi provides an intriguing venue for studying democratic responsiveness in poor urban 
communities. Though the particular mechanisms may differ due to Delhi’s institutional 
distinctiveness, we believe much can be learned about the underlying economic and social 
strategies that are readily generalizeable. 
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Delhi 
 
According to the Slum Area Act of 1956, “slums” are defined as those regions where buildings 
are unfit for human habitation for reasons such as dilapidation, overcrowding, and a lack of 
ventilation, light, and sanitary facilities. The emergence of slum housing in Delhi gained impetus 
in the years immediately following India’s independence in 1947. The partition of British India 
generated a wave of refugees into the city, doubling the population to 1.43 million between 1941 
and 1948. The subsequent half-century saw a rise in the estimated population to 12.5 million by 
the year 2000 (Misra, et.al 1998).  
Even while Delhi’s total population rose six-fold between 1951 and 1992, the slum 
population rose by more than twenty times; 259,000 Delhi households lived in “slum” dwellings 
in 1992 (Sridharan 1995). Delhi’s slum population is largely concentrated in the North—in and 
around the old walled city—as well as in high employment areas south of the administrative 
center (Sridharan 1995). This arm’s length arrangement has implied relatively large 
transportation costs for slum dwellers in accessing the back doors and metal detectors of formal 
authority. 
Institutional factors have also limited democratic responsiveness. As the seat of the 
federal government, the formal institutions of local representation in Delhi have long been 
subsumed by national imperatives. Until relatively recently, barring a few experiments at 
devolution, authority for most municipal issues was vested in the lieutenant governor and others 
appointed by the federal government. This rendered decision making largely unaccountable to 
slum dwellers. 
Not surprisingly then, from the period of the very first Five Year Plan of 1951, the Indian 
government has seen the emergence of slums as a problem rather than a solution to the dearth of 
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low-income housing. As a result, it has emphasized slum clearance and resettlement over a 
policy of community improvements (Sridharan 1995). Despite some controversy, these policies 
have been aggressively pursued throughout the last half-century, most notoriously during the 
‘Emergency’ of 1976-77. 
In 1993, however, a constitutional amendment provided the legal framework for 
establishing legislative bodies for each of India’s metropolitan areas, and the devolution of 
power from appointed to elected representatives (Sivaramakrishnan 1996). The granting of 
statehood to Delhi has led to a situation unique in India, a metropolis with its own legislature. 
The further devolution of real powers to the municipal corporations has also heightened the 
political importance of the slums. In their election literature, all MPs for Delhi highlight their 
efforts on behalf of slum-dwellersv. 
At present, the ‘city-state’ of Delhi is represented by a cabinet and chief minister selected 
according to their party’s representation in a seventy-strong legislative assembly. There are also 
three municipal corporations and seven Delhi MPs in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of 
Parliament. In the year of our survey, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ruled in the centre, with 
all of Delhi’s parliamentary seats, while the Congress party controlled the state legislature. 
 
III. Qualitative Evidence 
 
The comparative advantage of qualitative approaches is their capacity to shed light on issues 
pertaining to history, context, and process (Rao and Woolcock 2003). In this study, we sought to 
gain a greater understanding of the social mechanisms underpinning migration decisions; the 
specific strategies used to integrate into the city, manage collective action problems and relations 
with formal authorities; and how these changed over time and place. Where the quantitative 
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survey provides more general—and generalizable—insights on the demographic and political 
characteristics of Delhi slum dwellers, the qualitative evidence—by virtue of the large 
differences between the slums selected—enabled us to explore in greater depth the strategies 
chosen by slum dwellers to survive and advance.vi 
The scale and intensity of poverty in slums, and the fragility of the public services 
available to respond to it, bring forth an extraordinary range of coping strategies on the part of 
residents. Community leaders, front-line service staff, elected politicians, and slum residents 
themselves are the key players in this drama. The qualitative evidence from the four slums—
Lakshmi, Rajiv, Madanpuri and Pooriyaganjvii—reveals that the institutions of governance that 
have emerged in Delhi’s slums span a spectrum between traditional village institutions 
transplanted and adapted to the urban environment, and novel leadership structures. In the 
newest (and thus most precarious) slums, such as Madanpuri, the leaders themselves are being 
forced to adapt, assuming new identities and finding common ground among disparate and often 
disorganized sub-groups. 
 
The Adaptation of Traditional Structures 
The governance structures within the Rajiv colonyviii, near the walled city of Delhi, owe much to 
the traditional caste and gram panchayats that have their roots in rural India. Despite being a 
well-established slum that houses between 15,000 and 20,000 households, the Rajiv colony has 
little slum-wide “government” per se. Instead, each of its constituent communities—the 
Rajasthanis, Dholakwalas (traditional drummakers) and Bengalis—govern themselves, bound 
together by communal ties and a shared sense of solidarity in the face of pervasive risks, 
distinctive (usually low) social status, and (in the case of the Bengalis) illegal political status. 
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The leadership of the Rajasthani and Dholakwala communities mimics that of the village 
panchayat. The pradhan and a group of between 4 to 15 other elders meet to adjudicate on 
property and marital disputes. While in the Rajasthani basti, membership in the panchayat 
derives exclusively from seniority within the community, in the Dholakwala caste, five 
chaudhuris inherit their position and appoint the other members. Punishments can include 
sizeable fines and, in the case of inter-caste marriage, even ostracism from the community. 
While the authority of the pradhan and panchayat on marital disputes is largely 
unquestioned in these communities, the pradhan’s role as a guarantor of property rights within 
the slum has receded. As the slum has become better-established and prices for properties have 
risen, individual slum dwellers are devising their own means to buy and sell slum property, 
bypassing the pradhan and relying instead on witnesses. As one respondent describes: 
 
In the beginning, people used to give Rs. 100 or Rs. 200 to the pradhan of the basti at the 
time of possession. I also paid some amount of Rs. 200 to the pradhan for my land. 
However, this basti, the ‘Dholakwala Basti’, is now very famous. Things have changed 
because if now you pay Rs. 5000, you will not get a place for your jhuggi. Land has 
become costly. … 
 
We bring the pad and other affidavits from court and selling and purchasing takes place 
before at least eight to ten people who sign on the papers that this jhuggi has been sold to 
whomever. There is no need of the pradhan; we only need witnesses at the time of 
transaction. If we call the pradhan, we have to pay some amount to him; that’s why we 
try to avoid getting him involved. We also check the ration card and identity card of the 
owner of the jhuggi—these are the most essential documents to own a jhuggi. 
 
Unlike the traditional institutions devised by the Rajasthanis and Dholakwalas, Bengali migrants 
in the slum, a number of them Muslims, have been less successful at organizing themselves. 
Some accept the authority of the Rajasthani pradhan, while others seek to deal, individually, with 
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the formal government. Unlike in the other communities, disputes are resolved by the police and 
other authorities. 
 
Modern Leadership and Political Affiliations 
 
Pradhans clearly understood that one of their primary responsibilities was improving access to 
services and helping constituents manage risk. In their discussions with us they made much of 
their accomplishments, the ways in which they sought to both secure the loyalty of actual or 
potential constituents and establish their credibility and legitimacy.ix Most fascinating was the 
claim to a democratic mandate even by those who, to hear their constituents tell it, had acquired 
their power largely through coercion. Other leaders were selected through a consultative process 
through which residents “agree on some person as the most knowledgeable here, who can talk to 
other people on our behalf.”x  
Radha and Ganeshan, the rival pradhans of Lakshmi colony, provide two useful examples 
of the roles that pradhans play and the means by which they derive legitimacy. Established in the 
late 1970s, not long after the Emergency, Lakshmi colony, near central Delhi, is well-endowed 
with public amenities. The site had been officially allocated for a school, but the founder, Radha, 
who had once worked as a domestic servant for prominent members of India’s national 
independence movement, received assurances from leaders of the Congress party that the new 
settlement would be undisturbed. That these political links with the Congress had served the 
slum well over the years is suggested both by the degree to which slum dwellers had invested in 
their housing and in the level of public services. The residents of Lakshmi colony had enjoyed 
access to the municipal water supply for 17 years and each house had access to electricity. 
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Two years prior to our study, however, the slum had organized its own unofficial 
elections and Ganeshan had won. One aspect of his electoral appeal had been his social contacts 
with the Electricity Board (DESU). Acting as an intermediary between the slum dwellers and 
electricity officials, Ganeshan accepted contributions from members of the settlement in order to 
preserve the slum’s electricity supply. At the time of our study, however, the electricity had been 
turned off. The perceptions of slum dwellers about their ability to deal with formal government 
officials directly are revealing, both of the pradhan’s critical role as an intermediary and their 
own knowledge of and interactions with government figures. One claims: 
 
Now, if you go to any M.L.A. [to talk about the electricity problem], he says "go and talk 
to your pradhan." If you go to DESU—[name], the Chief Engineer—they say "talk to (the 
pradhan)." We have complained to the Chief Minister, but even there we have not got any 
reply. 
 
Despite the elections, Radha continued to maintain significant stature within the slum, and for 
many, continued to perform the role of a pradhan, facilitating access to formal authorities. This 
may have been due to her ties with the Congress party. As one respondent remarked: 
 
Someone in my husband’s office told him that a jhuggi (shack) was on sale here. He 
purchased it for 700 rupees and we moved in. Since then we have stayed here and, god-
willing, we will stay here forever, but we hear that there are moves to evict us. Today my 
husband and (Radha) will go and see the M.L.A. Of course we can’t expect any help 
from him because he is from the Congress and the Congress lost this election. 
 
Some respondents noted that the electricity to their slum was turned off the day 
after the B.J.P. took power. With the new government, Radha’s ties to the Congress party 
begin to look more like a liability. Apart from the two rival pradhans, two new 
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community leaders were vying for influence in the slum, one a Hindu preacher, another a 
Muslim. Despite religion, their political affiliations were much less clear. As the preacher 
declared, “I have nothing to do with Congress, B.J.P. Anyone who serves us, I will owe 
my loyalty to him.” 
For everyday slum dwellers, however, the management of collective action problems 
ends up being something for which they themselves must ultimately assume responsibility: the 
risks are simply too high and numerous, and the formal safety nets too frail. Residents can 
articulate the qualities they look for in a community leader, but in the end the efficacy of these 
leaders is largely a function of the length of tenure of the slum, the proximity of the home 
community, residents’ political status, and the severity of occupational and environmental 
hazards. In the most desperate of circumstances, any semblance of cooperation can break down, 
leading residents to gain pleasure only at the demise or misfortune of their neighbors. 
 
Leadership in the newest slums 
 
The newest bastis, like those in Madanpuri colony on the outskirts of the city, face the gravest 
challenges in organizing collective action and securing property. This is reflected in the near-
constant risk of demolition by the state, the fragility of housing materials, the absence of 
sanitation facilities and electricity, the lack of any enforcement of property rights, and endemic 
criminal activity. Respondents here reported that there were no informal or formal associations. 
A number claimed that community leadership was lacking, and that political parties had neither a 
contact point nor an incentive to engage with them. At the time of our survey, however, 
leadership structures were already beginning to form.  
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Within the newest slums, the close proximity, fragility, and flammable nature of jhuggis 
put them at grave risk. In contrast to more established colonies, such as Pooriyaganj, where an 
NGO provides public latrines at a nominal charge, sanitation facilities are completely absent in 
Madanpuri. As such, disease and illness are constant companions. By undermining the size and 
predictability of earnings, periods of illness also induce future vulnerability by causing drops in 
nutritional intake. Though several informants reported the presence of savings groups or other 
informal social mechanisms for addressing credit constraints, none reported mechanisms for 
insurance against health or other shocks. 
The risk of fire looms large, threatening to wipe out hard-won material gains (and lives) 
in an instant. On this front, making dwellings “pucca” presents perhaps the most tangible 
mechanism for reducing the risk of fire, enabling dwellings to be constructed of less flammable 
substances. However, the lack of property rights that are secure from either state demolition or 
from local criminals appears to reduce incentives to invest in housing.  
Theft is indeed a widespread problem, one that residents contend with primarily through 
their own vigilance.xi A constant theme in the least established slums was the predatory role 
played by the police, who, far from responding promptly to crimes and impartially enforcing the 
law, were routinely cited for, at best, their indifference to the plight of slum dwellers, and, at 
worst, their active complicity in extortion, harassment, and unlawful detention.xii Several 
Bangladeshi residents, most of whom were illegal immigrants, reported being forced to pay 
money to avoid being jailed and beaten; others spoke of being locked away until their neighbors 
paid for their release. 
In the newest, most heterogeneous slums, novel leadership structures are both most 
necessary and most difficult to develop. Yet, the case of Manoj Kumar, the emerging pradhan of 
 16
Madanpuri basti, illustrates three devices that are potentially valuable for engendering collective 
action in these slums. Their homes demolished only months prior to our survey, the residents of 
Madanpuri basti continued to fear the return of government bulldozers. Without having held 
formal elections and with too diverse a migrant population to benefit from traditional institutions, 
the slum lacked an obvious source of governance and leadership. As a result, several contenders 
had emerged to play the role of pradhan. Of these Manoj Kumar had gained ascendancy during 
the period of our study. Three of his actions may hint at why. 
First, as an early resident of the slum, he established a temple, a focus of community 
activity. This temple was one of the few structures that survived the demolition. Second was his 
role as a network entrepreneur. Though hailing from Uttar Pradesh, Manoj Kumar broke with 
custom and married a Bengali speaker, bridging two linguistic constituencies within the slum. 
Third, Manoj Kumar emphasizes that his education played an important role, as he volunteered 
to file applications for ration cards for the illiterate and acted as an intermediary between slum 
dwellers, officials, and politicians. When discussing the other self-nominated leaders of the slum, 
Manoj Kumar is dismissive, citing his ties with political figures and officialdom.xiii As for his 
own legitimacy, Manoj Kumar acknowledges his lack of a formal democratic mandate: 
 
I have received a lot of love and respect from my people and I have earned a lot through 
honest means. I might not be an elected member of the Municipal Council, but I am 
respected like one. My wants are always respected because my demands are legitimate. 
I’m against corruption. 
 
Though as noted above, some respondents from the slum seemed unaware that a pradhan 
existed at all, those that knew him appeared content to delegate their dealings with officials to 
Manoj Kumar.xiv 
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IV. Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Evidence 
 
The qualitative module highlighted a number of issues to pursue in the quantitative component. 
A key theme emphasized the importance of the pradhan in acting both as a facilitator of 
interaction between slum dwellers and formal government authorities and an intermediary 
between them. Yet, as the discussion above reveals, both the role played by the pradhan and the 
mechanisms through which pradhans gain authority tended to differ according to the duration of 
establishment and the ethnic heterogeneity of the slum.  In established slums like Lakshmi 
colony, the pradhan’s role appeared to be more of a facilitator, helping individuals to contact 
external figures like the electricity board.  Iin newer slums, like Madanpuri, slum dwellers were 
content to delegate responsibility for dealing with the external authorities to their educated 
leader, Manoj Kumar.  
Furthermore the qualitative evidence suggested that while in ethnically homogeneous 
settlements, like the Rajasthani and Dholakwalla bastis, leadership institutions were transplants 
from traditional village panchayat systems, heterogeneous slums required the development of 
novel leadership structures. The method through which the pradhan derived authority—whether 
through existing political affiliations as in the case of Radha, or through shared identity and 
education as in the case of Manoj Kumar—differed according to the age and ethnic provenance 
of the slum. For the quantitative work, these findings suggest that there should be important 
differences in the pradhan’s role according to the heterogeneity and age of the slum. 
A further source of heterogeneity lies in the extent of governance networks among slum 
dwellers lies in the differing incentives and roles of the external authorities themselves. The 
qualitative evidence suggested that slums as a whole take on political patronage as a defensive 
device, donning names like ‘the Immortal Rajiv colony’ in honor of particular political leaders. 
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The association of a slum’s pradhan with a particular political party—as in the Congress Party in 
the case of Radha—and the conditionality of services based on political affiliation suggests that 
pradhans play a central role in the quid pro quo between slum dwellers and elected politicians, 
where blocks of votes and manpower at rallies are exchanged for services and protection.  
Of the other external authorities, bureaucrats and police featured prominently in the 
qualitative module. For obtaining the delivery of services such as electricity and water, pradhans 
such as Ganesan seem to act as crucial intermediaries between slum dwellers and bureaucrats, 
their role perhaps magnified by the lack of incentives bureaucrats face in dealing with the poor. 
In contrast, police officers appear to play differing roles, enforcing property rights for the 
unorganized Bengalis of the Rajiv colony, but being themselves responsible for expropriation in 
Madanpuri. The role of the pradhan thus lies in shielding slum dwellers from unwanted police 
attention in less organized slums and providing a substitute for formal police enforcement in 
their more established counterparts.  
To test whether in fact the relationships uncovered in the qualitative module held for 
Delhi as a whole, we used the representative sample from the quantitative module to evaluate the 
extent to which slum dwellers knew and had interacted with external authority figures was 
influenced by their own characteristics and social networks, and the role played by their pradhan 
in providing access to different formal authorities. The dependent variables we examine are 
whether a respondent “knows and has interacted with” bureaucrats, elected politicians, 
policeman and pradhans themselves. Thus, we analyzed linear probability regressions of the 
following form: 
 
   P(governance networki) = α + X1i Βi + X2c Γc + contactsi Κi + pradhani Π i + εi      (1) 
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where X1i is a set of household head characteristics (asset wealth, age, years of residence, 
education, sex, household size, caste and religious identity) and X2c is a set of basti controls (age, 
population), contactsi is a vector of the initial contacts of the household head prior to migration 
to Delhi (immediate relations, fellow villagers, other contacts), pradhani is a set of pradhan’s 
characteristics (shared identity with the household head, education, political affiliation, duration 
of residence in the slum). The errors are assumed to be arbitrarily correlated within slum clusters, 
and robust to heteroskedasticity.  
Further, we sought to identify which the pradhan’s characteristics were more important 
and whether these differed according to the age of the slum and in enclaves containing many 
individuals from the same village. This involved including interaction terms between pradhani 
and the age of the slum on one hand, and whether migrants to the slum possessed village contacts 
prior to arrival. 
The basic regression specified above suffers from the drawback that both contacts and 
wealthxv may be endogenous to the slum dweller’s decision to gain access to formal government. 
It could be that access to formal government authorities may be parlayed into wealth and or 
enhanced social standing, biasing the correlation between wealth and governance networks 
upwards. Alternatively, since acquisition of governance networks can be costly—in terms of 
gifts, bribes, time etc.—yet may pay dividends in the future, it may be that such networks are 
themselves a form of savings. If individuals save a fixed proportion of their wealth, then such 
savings may displace assets and within-slum social networks. Thus we might expect a weaker 
correlation between material assets and governance networks in a simple regression. 
We adopt two strategies to identify the effect that these variables have upon political 
access. We use a migrant’s initial contacts prior to their arrival in Delhi as a proxy for the 
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migrant’s current contacts. These contacts are determined prior to the decision to become 
acquainted with a political figure in the city, and are also likely to have path dependencies. 
Hence they represent the lower bound of current contacts available to an individual choosing to 
gain access to their political representatives. 
To address the potential endogeneity of wealth, we adapt a strategy used by Munshi 
(2003), exploiting our knowledge of households’ year of migration and district of origin to 
incorporate the extensive Indian climate data set, gathered by the World Bank. This dataset 
extends from 1955 to 1987, providing detailed information on prices and crop yields for virtually 
all districts of India. These crops (wheat and maize) have been in widespread production around 
India over the last 40 years. Wheat was the central crop in India’s Green Revolution, while maize 
is traditionally considered an inferior good. The shifts in production levels between these crops 
provide useful indicators of the economic situation in the migrant’s home district. 
We take five year averages of crop revenue (the product of local agricultural prices and 
the district crop yield) preceding the individual’s departure from their home district. To construct 
our instrument set, we find the deviations in revenue from this average in the year of the 
individual’s departure. Unlike rainfall, the use of crop revenue deviations provides an instrument 
that is unaffected by the widespread adoption of water storage and irrigation technologies. Yet, 
since such deviations are largely the result of exogenous weather shocks, a fall in revenue is 
likely to increase the “push” factors for out-migration. Such push factors are also far more likely 
to matter for the poor, since wealthier households are better protected from agricultural risk. 
Thus, the exclusion restriction we propose is that district-wide deviations from revenue are likely 
to be correlated with household wealth but not to their access to power networks in the city.xvi 
We test for this explicitly with Hansen’s over-identification test.  
 21
Table 1 provides summary statistics from the quantitative data, focusing on the heads of 
households. Of the individuals in our sample, 87 percent were born outside Delhi. Education 
levels are relatively low: 4.5 years of schooling on average. More than half of respondents note 
that they knew a person from their home village in the city prior to migrating; on the other hand, 
only 12 percent knew a close relative. A remarkable percentage of respondents (54%) are from 
scheduled castes or tribes—historically underprivileged groups with preferential access to 
government jobs and education. A likely reason for this is that Delhi, as India’s capital, provides 
many such opportunities. 
Respondents naturally had greater interaction with leaders from within the slum. 83 
percent claimed to “know and regularly interact” with their pradhan, and 52 percent to know and 
interact with community or religious leaders. Yet, a striking finding lies in the extent to which 
governance networks extend beyond the slum’s boundaries. A remarkable 30 percent had 
interacted with elected politicians; in fact, one in four claimed to have interacted with a member 
of parliament. We were surprised by these figures at first and conducted further interviews to 
identify why this is the case. These suggested that Delhi slums are the source of “garrisons” for 
politicians who use them for boosting attendance at rallies. Politicians also pay careful attention 
to slum dwellers so they can be assured source of votes. The possibility of pure exaggeration 
seems unlikely given the contrastingly low percentages that report an acquaintance with 
bureaucrats (10%) and NGO staff (8%). These figures instead appear to be consistent with the 
limited incentives NGO staff and bureaucrats face to interact with the poor. 
  One concern with our identification strategy is that the first stage regression can only be 
estimated on the sub-sample that migrated to Delhi within the coverage of the climate data. Thus 
Table 1 also compares whether the migrant sub-sample is different in their observed 
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characteristics from the entire sample. The samples are not significantly different from each 
other on almost all the characteristics, except household size (migrant households are about 0.3 
persons larger), age of head of household (migrant heads are 1.4 years older), and initial contact 
with a fellow villager (about 0.07% more for a migrant than a Delhi native). In the following 
discussion, we present both OLS results from the full sample and the 2SLS linear probability 
model on the migrant sub-sample. 
 
Regression results 
 
Table 2xvii reveals a consistent pattern of interaction between individuals and pradhans. In both 
the OLS and 2SLS specifications, we find that household heads are roughly 20 percent more 
likely to know a pradhan who has a professed political affiliation. This effect is even more 
pronounced in the newest slums, but decreases as slums become more established over time. 
Individual contacts and wealth are less important. The last panel suggests that having a network 
of others from a migrant’s home village decreases probability of interaction with the slum 
leadership, unless the pradhan himself shares the caste or religious identity. This is consistent 
with the qualitative evidence from the Rajiv colony: ethnic groups migrating together transplant 
traditional leadership structures from the village, but are less likely to interact with the broader 
slum leadership in heterogeneous slums.xviii  
 Bureaucrats, unlike pradhans, are more likely to interact with elite slum dwellers. Table 3 
shows that those with broad networks that extend beyond close relatives or villagers gain better 
access to government officials. Further, there is a significant effect of material wealth: a Rs. 
10,000 increase in wealth results in a 6 to 16 percent increase in access in the OLS and IV 
regressions, respectively. The remarkable increase in the IV estimate of the wealth effect—a 
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finding that also holds true for the police and elected politicians—suggests that there is little 
direct positive feedback between political networks and material wealth. Instead it may be that 
governance ties provide slum dwellers an alternative asset class for savings and risk 
management. Such alternative strategies are unavailable to rural residents. 
Table 3 also demonstrates the importance of the pradhan, and the differences in his or her 
role as the settlement becomes more established. The first two columns demonstrate that 
assuming that pradhans of a particular identity, education, affiliation and years of residence have 
the same level of influence in all slums, we find little effect of the pradhan’s characteristics on 
bureaucratic networks. However, allowing for changes in the pradhan’s role as slums become 
more established and slum dwellers more embedded in village networks, a very different picture 
emerges.  
In a manner reminiscent of Manoj Kumar’s taking care of the ‘documents’ of Madanpuri, 
in the newest slums, politically affiliated pradhans are apparently delegated responsibility for 
bureaucratic issues reducing the probability of direct interaction between bureaucrats and slum 
dwellers by around 30%. This relationship decreases by around 1% for every year the slum 
continues to survive. In contrast, more educated pradhans appear to act as facilitators of 
interaction in the newest slums, a relationship that reduces as the slum becomes more 
established. The consistent pattern that emerges is that pradhans’ intermediating role for 
bureaucratic interaction is greatest in the youngest, most fragile settlements.  
Similar results hold for police officers in Table 4, but here rather than the length of slum 
establishment influencing the pradhan’s importance, it is the density of village networks. 
Residents with fellow villagers in their slum and politically affiliated pradhans are the most 
shielded from police attention, with the probability of interaction dropping by around a third. 
 24
More educated pradhans also seem better able to protect slum dwellers from the police. The 
pradhan’s influence is even larger than that of the householder’s own wealth, even though the 
effect of having an additional Rs. 10,000 in assets increases police interaction significantly from 
6 to 22 percent in the IV specification.  
Finally, Table 5 examines access to elected politicians. Here again we see a strong elite 
effect with wealthier individuals (coefficients increasing from 9 to 20 percent in the IV 
specification for a 10,000 rupee increase in wealth), and those who had close relatives in the city 
prior to migrating, having a much higher chance of knowing and interacting with an elected 
politician. 
 Once again, the importance of the pradhan is largely lost unless we consider the different 
role informal leaders play in different types of slums. Two effects are worthy of note. First, more 
educated pradhans reduce the probability of direct interaction between slum dwellers and 
politicians in the newest slums by around 1% for every additional year of education. This effect 
however is much less if the slum dweller is embedded among fellow villagers. As in the case of 
Madanpuri, this suggests that in more heterogeneous slums, pradhans gain part of their ability to 
speak for the slum through education. 
 In contrast, the interaction between slum dwellers in ethnic enclaves and politically 
affiliated pradhans increases the probability of slum dweller interaction with politicians by 
around 37 percent. This effect reverses that seen for the police. Once again, the qualitative 
evidence, particularly from Lakshmi colony, provide an interpretation: politically affiliated 
pradhans in ethnic enclaves are better able to deliver blocks of manpower to politicians’ rallies, 
this very political access protecting them from police intervention.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
This study has used “participatory econometrics” to shed some light on the understudied 
question of the internal governance of slums in Delhi. In-depth qualitative work in four slums 
selected with a comparative design helped inform the construction of a questionnaire that was 
administered to a representative sample of households in Delhi slums. This allowed us to check 
the generalizability of our qualitative findings. 
The qualitative work highlighted the extremely risky environments under which slum 
residents lived: subject to a constant threat of demolition, fire, theft, and uncertain property 
rights. Informal systems of government evolved in these slums whose primary role was to serve 
as intermediaries to mitigate this risk and to provide access to public services. However, less 
established slums and those that were more heterogeneous in their networks seemed to be 
particularly vulnerable and received greater benefits from the role of the pradhan. 
The quantitative results both reinforce and extend the qualitative findings. Pradhans are 
accessed by people of all social classes, and even by those who otherwise have few networks. A 
remarkable proportion of slum dwellers interact with elected politicians, though fewer gain 
access to bureaucrats. Pradhans play a crucial role in intermediating between slum dwellers and 
formal government, but this role becomes less pronounced over time. Slum dwellers embedded 
in village networks tend to benefit the most from the pradhans’ intervention, being shielded from 
the police and gaining enhanced access to politicians. Education and existing political affiliation 
are the main characteristics that drive a pradhan’s ability to manipulate government networks. 
Access to sources of authority like politicians, bureaucrats and police officers is elite driven, and 
more likely to occur in more established slums. 
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Urbanization in Delhi does appear to be providing the poor with a greater voice in 
democratic discourse. Slum dwellers benefit from remarkable access to politicians and other 
government officials. Though wealthier slum dwellers do seem more able to make themselves 
heard, a more important factor is the degree of informal organization achieved by the slum itself. 
Acting collectively, even poor slum dwellers can gain a voice. Such organization is easiest in 
ethnically-homogeneous, more established enclaves, but even in the newest slums, leaders can 
emerge to act as a conduit for democratic responsiveness. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Full sample 
mean 
Migrant 
subsample 
mean 
Difference:      
migrant - 
fullsample 
Categorical Variables       
Knows Pradhan 0.8279 0.8382 0.0102 
Knows Community or religious leader 0.5237 0.5332 0.0095 
Knows Bureaucrat 0.0973 0.0934 -0.0039 
Knows Police 0.1434 0.1349 -0.0085 
Knows and interacts with NGO Staff 0.0798 0.0892 0.0094 
Knows Elected politician (MLA, MP, Munic. Council) 0.2993 0.3216 0.0223 
Init. contact: close relative 0.1210 0.1371 0.0161 
Init. contact: villager 0.5187 0.5851 0.0664** 
Init. contact: other 0.1646 0.1846 0.0201 
Female 0.0623 0.0705 0.0082 
(Other) Backward Caste 0.1782 0.1846 0.0065 
Scheduled Caste or Tribe 0.5307 0.5207 -0.0100 
Muslim 0.1047 0.1203 0.0156 
Pradhan-shared identity 0.2606 0.2448 -0.0158 
Pradhan- political affil. 0.9339 0.9544 0.0204 
Continuous Variables       
Household assets net of housing values 3156.35 3131.49 -24.86 
 (8162.08) (8660.51) (488.55) 
Age (In Years) 38.0087 39.3817 1.3730** 
 (11.0357) (10.4392) (0.6148) 
Years in Delhi 19.5412 19.7905 0.2493 
 (10.8554) (6.3580) (0.4804) 
Education (Years) 4.4501 4.1452 -0.3049 
 (4.5781) (4.4846) (0.2605) 
Household size 4.9950 5.2863 0.2913** 
 (1.9327) (1.9250) (0.1111) 
Pradhan's education 6.2743 6.4979 0.2236 
 (4.8157) (4.8298) (0.2781) 
Pradhan's community years 17.4825 17.1017 -0.3809 
 (7.0037) (6.6633) (0.3915) 
Age of basti settlement 20.4489 19.9108 -0.5381 
 (7.0669) (6.4739) (0.3863) 
Number of households in the basti 2308.33 2568.58 260.25 
  (3445.52) (3706.86) (208.11) 
Notes: 1) standard deviations, and standard errors for the means and respectively the difference, in parentheses, 
for the continuous variables    
2) * difference significant at 10%, ** difference significant at 5%, using a t-test for the continuous variables,  
and a chi-squared test for the categorical variables    
3)Pradhan-shared identity is an indicator = 1 if the respondent has the same caste or religion as the pradhan 
4)Pradhan political affiliation is an indicator = 1 if the pradhan reported any political affiliation  
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Table 2: 
Governance networks: pradhan 
  
Individual 
regression 
Pradhan 
characteristics 2SLS 
Basti age 
x 2SLS 
Village 
x 2SLS 
Assets (Rs. 10000s) 0.025 0.026 0.151 0.019 0.153 0.025 0.171 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.085]+ [0.016] [0.085]+ [0.015] [0.097]+
Init. contact: close relative 0.002 0.004 -0.023 -0.005 -0.022 0.004 -0.028 
 [0.036] [0.035] [0.051] [0.036] [0.051] [0.034] [0.052] 
Init. contact: villager 0.010 0.005 -0.071 0.003 -0.069 -0.175 -0.249 
 [0.027] [0.029] [0.056] [0.029] [0.055] [0.119] [0.216] 
Init. contact: other -0.044 -0.057 -0.037 -0.044 -0.029 -0.049 -0.030 
 [0.040] [0.040] [0.052] [0.037] [0.051] [0.041] [0.052] 
Pradhan-shared identity  -0.061 -0.024 -0.160 -0.086 -0.128 -0.116 
  [0.036] [0.030] [0.146] [0.156] [0.063]+ [0.083] 
Pradhan's education  0.005 0.003 -0.016 -0.006 0.009 0.008 
  [0.007] [0.008] [0.023] [0.027] [0.007] [0.009] 
Pradhan- political affil.  0.230 0.200 0.774 0.542 0.172 0.099 
  [0.129]+ [0.111]+ [0.156]** [0.179]** [0.156] [0.158] 
Pradhan's community yrs  0.006 0.007 0.026 0.030 0.004 0.006 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.021] [0.023] [0.005] [0.008] 
Basti age x prdn shared 
id.    0.005 0.004   
    [0.006] [0.007]   
Basti age x prdn's educ.    0.001 0.001   
    [0.001] [0.001]   
Basti age x pol. affil.    -0.026 -0.016   
    [0.005]** [0.007]*   
Basti age x prdn's 
res.(yrs)    -0.001 -0.001   
    [0.001] [0.001]   
Villager x prdn shared id.      0.130 0.145 
      [0.062]* [0.098] 
Villager x prdn's educ.      -0.007 -0.008 
      [0.002]** [0.006] 
Villager x pol. affil.      0.124 0.173 
      [0.107] [0.223] 
Villager x prdn's res.(yrs)      0.005 0.001 
      [0.003] [0.004] 
Household / basti controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 780 780 474 780 474 780 474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.07  0.11  0.08  
F 3.42 8.81 0.137 47.3 0.144 38.01 0.193 
Hansen's over-id J   3.451  3.528  3.704 
Prob > chi2     0.063   0.06   0.054 
Robust standard errors in brackets       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
Robust standard errors, clustered at the slum level      
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Table 3 
Governance networks: Bureaucrats 
  
Individual 
regression 
Pradhan 
characteristics 2SLS 
Basti age 
x 2SLS 
Village 
x 2SLS 
Assets (Rs. 10000s) 0.058 0.058 0.167 0.058 0.161 0.057 0.167 
 [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.086]+ [0.014]** [0.085]+ [0.014]** [0.079]*
Init. contact: close relative -0.008 -0.008 -0.016 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.018 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.042] [0.029] [0.043] [0.029] [0.040] 
Init. contact: villager 0.035 0.035 -0.016 0.036 -0.012 -0.137 -0.147 
 [0.021] [0.022] [0.049] [0.022] [0.047] [0.092] [0.195] 
Init. contact: other 0.071 0.071 0.044 0.072 0.052 0.070 0.046 
 [0.025]** [0.026]* [0.044] [0.026]* [0.043] [0.028]* [0.047] 
Pradhan-shared identity  0.018 0.006 0.005 -0.014 0.049 0.034 
  [0.023] [0.039] [0.067] [0.118] [0.028]+ [0.060] 
Pradhan's education  0.001 0.003 0.007 0.028 -0.004 -0.003 
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.006] [0.008]** [0.002]+ [0.004] 
Pradhan- political affil.  -0.017 -0.066 -0.121 -0.314 -0.054 -0.139 
  [0.025] [0.065] [0.060]+ [0.131]* [0.028]+ [0.138] 
Pradhan's community yrs  -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.011 -0.002 -0.001 
  [0.001] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006]+ [0.001] [0.003] 
Basti age x prdn shared 
id.    0.001 0.002   
    [0.003] [0.005]   
Basti age x prdn's educ.    0.000 -0.001   
    [0.000] [0.000]**   
Basti age x pol. affil.    0.004 0.011   
    [0.002]+ [0.005]*   
Basti age x prdn's 
res.(yrs)    0.000 0.000   
    [0.000] [0.000]*   
Villager x prdn shared id.      -0.049 -0.044 
      [0.040] [0.061] 
Villager x prdn's educ.      0.009 0.010 
      [0.004]* [0.006] 
Villager x pol. affil.      0.082 0.107 
      [0.073] [0.194] 
Villager x prdn's res.(yrs)      0.003 -0.002 
      [0.002] [0.003] 
Household / basti controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 780 780 474 780 474 780 474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.06  0.05  0.06  
F 16.2 25.44 0.097 108.63 0.515 54.79 0.067 
Hansen's over-id J   0.036  0.034  0.009 
Prob > chi2     0.849   0.854   0.923
Robust standard errors in brackets       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%      
robust standard errors, clustered at the slum level      
 30
 
Table 4 
Governance regressions: police officers 
  
Individual 
regression 
Pradhan 
characteristics 2SLS 
Basti age 
x 2SLS 
Village 
x 2SLS 
Assets (Rs. 10000s) 0.061 0.061 0.200 0.060 0.188 0.059 0.222 
 [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.130] [0.014]** [0.123] [0.014]** [0.124]+
Init. contact: close relative 0.032 0.032 0.006 0.033 0.014 0.029 -0.004 
 [0.043] [0.041] [0.046] [0.042] [0.047] [0.041] [0.041] 
Init. contact: villager 0.009 0.013 -0.037 0.013 -0.032 -0.137 -0.250 
 [0.035] [0.035] [0.065] [0.035] [0.063] [0.109] [0.167] 
Init. contact: other -0.053 -0.045 -0.063 -0.041 -0.053 -0.040 -0.060 
 [0.031]+ [0.030] [0.050] [0.030] [0.048] [0.031] [0.053] 
Pradhan-shared identity  0.010 0.024 0.049 0.232 -0.016 0.000 
  [0.030] [0.037] [0.091] [0.139]+ [0.044] [0.079] 
Pradhan's education  -0.008 -0.009 -0.004 0.018 -0.008 -0.004 
  [0.004]+ [0.005]+ [0.011] [0.012] [0.003]* [0.005] 
Pradhan- political affil.  -0.008 0.060 0.048 0.089 -0.078 -0.133 
  [0.040] [0.053] [0.095] [0.138] [0.035]* [0.117] 
Pradhan's community yrs  -0.004 -0.006 0.006 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
  [0.002] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009] [0.002] [0.003] 
Basti age x prdn shared 
id.    -0.001 -0.009   
    [0.004] [0.006]   
Basti age x prdn's educ.    0.000 -0.001   
    [0.001] [0.001]*   
Basti age x pol. affil.    -0.003 0.000   
    [0.003] [0.005]   
Basti age x prdn's 
res.(yrs)    0.000 0.000   
    [0.000] [0.000]   
Villager x prdn shared id.      0.054 0.042 
      [0.063] [0.100] 
Villager x prdn's educ.      -0.001 -0.009 
      [0.007] [0.006]+
Villager x pol. affil.      0.153 0.315 
      [0.072]* [0.153]* 
Villager x prdn's res.(yrs)      0.000 -0.003 
      [0.004] [0.005] 
Household / basti controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 780 780 474 780 474 780 474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.07  0.07  0.07  
F 13.26 44.48 0.091 64.93 0.212 44.08 0.171 
Hansen's over-id J   0.618  0.684  0.476 
Prob > chi2     0.432   0.408   0.49 
Robust standard errors in brackets       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
robust standard errors, clustered at the slum level      
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Table 5 
Governance networks: elected politicians (LPM) 
  
Individual 
regression 
Pradhan 
characteristics 2SLS 
Basti age 
x 2SLS 
Village 
x 2SLS 
Assets (Rs. 10000s) 0.093 0.091 0.199 0.089 0.202 0.090 0.199 
 [0.022]** [0.023]** [0.113]+ [0.023]** [0.109]+ [0.022]** [0.110]+ 
Init. contact: close relative 0.169 0.159 0.186 0.156 0.190 0.155 0.183 
 [0.059]** [0.059]* [0.066]** [0.059]* [0.069]** [0.059]* [0.067]**
Init. contact: villager 0.062 0.053 0.036 0.052 0.041 -0.264 -0.519 
 [0.033]+ [0.033] [0.064] [0.033] [0.063] [0.109]* [0.179]**
Init. contact: other -0.022 -0.024 -0.029 -0.024 -0.026 -0.022 -0.031 
 [0.034] [0.031] [0.053] [0.032] [0.052] [0.032] [0.055] 
Pradhan-shared identity  0.078 0.071 -0.148 -0.240 0.089 0.180 
  [0.041]+ [0.055] [0.132] [0.243] [0.050]+ [0.099]+ 
Pradhan's education  -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 0.018 -0.004 -0.013 
  [0.002] [0.003]* [0.007] [0.013] [0.004] [0.004]**
Pradhan- political affil.  0.066 0.080 0.154 0.242 -0.025 -0.163 
  [0.047] [0.080] [0.089]+ [0.128]+ [0.063] [0.111] 
Pradhan's community yrs  0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.011 0.000 -0.003 
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004] [0.006] 
Basti age x prdn shared 
id.    0.010 0.014   
    [0.005]+ [0.010]   
Basti age x prdn's educ.    0.000 -0.001   
    [0.000] [0.001]*   
Basti age x pol. affil.    -0.003 -0.002   
    [0.003] [0.006]   
Basti age x prdn's 
res.(yrs)    0.000 0.001   
    [0.000] [0.000]*   
Villager x prdn shared id.      -0.008 -0.149 
      [0.061] [0.110] 
Villager x prdn's educ.      0.003 0.009 
      [0.004] [0.006] 
Villager x pol. affil.      0.196 0.369 
      [0.091]* [0.139]**
Villager x prdn's res.(yrs)      0.007 0.010 
      [0.004]+ [0.006]+ 
Household / basti controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 780 780 474 780 474 780 474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.08  0.08  0.08  
F 6.72 8.67 0.29 41.57 1.00 42.86 0.77 
Hansen's over-id J   0.31  0.40  0.30 
Prob > chi2     0.58   0.53   0.59 
Robust standard errors in brackets       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
robust standard errors, clustered at the slum level      
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Endnotes: 
 
i Mitra (2003) reports on a quantitative analysis of these data. 
ii It should be noted that while ensuring a comprehensive, randomized, and uniform approach to the sample selection 
process, the use of the official register might bias our sample against the inclusion of the most recent—and 
presumably most vulnerable—migrants living in those spaces not yet recognized by the development authority. 
iii For comparative transnational perspectives, see Radoki and Jones (2002) and Roy and Alsayyad (2004). In India, 
journalists (Mehta 2004) usefully complement the scholarly literature (e.g., Sandhu 2003, Mitra 2004). 
iv This is steadily beginning to change due to pressures on governments and development agencies to address the 
clearest manifestations of urban squalor and unrest in low-income countries (e.g., Imparato and Ruster 2003, Fay 
2005), and the high media profile now accorded to resettlement initiatives. 
v See e.g. the Parliament website: http://www.alfa.nic.in. 
vi For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the responses pertaining to the management of collective action 
problems and relations with the state. In the broader sense, however, retaining social ties—and the sense of identity 
that goes with it—to the community of origin is itself part of the risk management strategy. Our respondents 
frequently expressed a desire to make annual return visits, a wish for their children to be born in (and subsequently 
married to partners from) their home community, and a hope that they would eventually return home. The 
demographic profile (not reported here) certainly supports this, with a huge bulge in the age distribution between 20 
and 40 years. In colloquial terms, slum residents are hatched, matched, and dispatched in villages, but in their peak 
earning years seek their fortune in the dynamic, if squalid and dangerous, city. 
vii Names of the slums have been changed to protect the identity of respondents. 
viii Some terminology for the general reader: in India, slums in their entirety are often referred to as colonies; within 
colonies are bastis (particular spatially defined sub-communities usually sharing a common ethnicity, caste, religion, 
nationality, or home village/state). Bastis are comprised of jhuggis (the most humble of family dwellings, typically 
made from cardboard and sticks) which residents hope to make pucca (i.e., upgrade to corrugated iron or some other 
more durable, less porous material). Slum-wide leaders, known as pradhans, may preside over councils or 
panchayats. Power of a different kind is wielded by less savory strongmen—i.e., those called upon to collect bribes, 
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intimidate residents, and extract special ‘service fees’ (e.g,, for electricity connections or physical protection)—
known as goondas. 
ix One of the most tangible manifestations of this is securing control of the (black) ‘market’ for ration cards and 
tokens, the formal markers of citizenship and identity that enable residents to make claims against the state and 
receive entitlements to basic foodstuffs. 
x Resident of Rajiv colony. 
xi In this sense, we can surmise that risk as experienced in poor urban communities is quite different from that 
experienced in poor rural areas. In the latter, risks tend to be associated with crop failure (through drought, flood, 
disease, or insect invasion) and often non-existent public services. In the former, risk stems from poorly defined 
property rights; higher susceptibility to contagious and water-borne diseases; exposure to organized crime, drugs, 
and gang violence; unemployment, underemployment, and/or unsafe working conditions; overwhelmed (as opposed 
to absent) public services; and the adverse effects of regional and national macro-economic shocks. This has 
important scholarly and policy implications, given that (as indicated above) most of our formal models and theories 
of poverty are largely derived from rural data. 
xii This is true even in more established slums. “When we go to the police”, says a resident of Rajiv colony, “they do 
not listen to us. Even if we are severely injured they do not file a case. They take Rs. 1000-2000 from the accused 
and leave him. So what happens to them? They get beaten up and nothing happens to the guilty party… People do 
not support each other because they are scared; they just stand by and see people being beaten up.” Laments another 
resident, “We sometimes say to the police, ‘I shall complain against you’, but the police reply, ‘If you complain 
against us then somebody else will do the same job we are doing.’… Those who are honest and poor, nobody 
respects them.” 
xiii He claims: 
They have to do whatever I do – if I call the MLA. Next day they have to. If I call the Nigam Parshad (Municipal 
Council). Next day they have to. 
xiv As one remarks, “the Pradhan looks after (legal documents); it is not my headache. We don’t have any legal 
documents.” 
xv Current wealth is measured by the total value of household durable goods and financial instruments. This figure 
does not include housing values. Given unclearly-defined property rights, our estimates of property wealth that can 
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be realised is tenuous, and so we prefer this imperfect measure of wealth. It is reassuring, however, that the 
correlation between wealth net and inclusive of housing valuations approaches a third. 
 
xvi A joint significance test of the instruments in the first stage regression yields an F-statistic of 9.24, significant at 
the 0.1% level. 
xvii The regressions in Tables 2-5 control for individual and basti characteristics, but we do not report these effects 
for reasons of brevity. 
 
xviii Notice that the over-identification test comes close to rejection, casting doubt on our proposed exclusion 
restriction in the case of the pradhan. Given that the same push factors that result in migration by the less wealthy 
also encourage simultaneous migration by other villagers and thus potentially leadership selection, the possibility of 
a direct effect of crop deviations on an individual’s ties to the slum leader cannot be dismissed. For formal 
government authorities, the above argument does not hold, and reassuringly Hansen's test does not approach 
rejection for any of the other governance networks. 
